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I. INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years have passed since the reunification of Germany, or the
incorporation of the former German Democratic Republic (East Germany or
GDR) into the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany or FRG),' a
sufficient period to permit appropriate evaluation of the economic impact of
over forty years of separation between the two parts of a previously unified
nation. The significance of evaluating this period of separation and the
ensuing years of reunification transcends its meaning to the German people
because of the growing conviction among the world's nationbuilders that a
certain legal regime provides the maximum impetus for increasing the wealth
of nations. 2 Neither the private market nor capitalism more fundamentally
explains the conditions for economic growth, which are more closely related
to that which frames and enables both phenomena in prosperous nations
everywhere-the broad and adequately enforced legal institution of private
property.' Such an institution has been in place in the Federal Republic of
Germany, both during division and since reunification, whereas East Germany
lacked this institution.
Before World War II, all Germans shared the same economy, educational
opportunities, and cultural identity.' Consequently, the division of Germany
into two nations and its subsequent reunification furnish an excellent
opportunity to measure whether the socialist elimination of private property in
the production and distribution of resources or a broader and more liberal
private property regime makes for an economically wealthier society. This
The reunification occurred in 1990. Since that time, the reunified nation has been called
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).
2 See generally 0. Lee Reed, Nationbuilding 101: Reductionism in Property Liberty, and
Corporate Governance, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 673 (2003).
3 Although the private market and capitalism are important to wealth formation, the
functioning of these institutions is premised on an adequate private property system. See. e.g.,
Edgar L. Feige, Underground Activity and Institutional Change: Productive, Protective, and
Predatory Behavior in Transition Economies, in TRANSFORMING POST-COMMUNIST POLITICAL
ECONOMIES 21,22 (Joan M. Nelson et al., eds., 1997) ("Every market presupposes the existence
of property rights to be traded."). "Capitalism" refers to a system in which there is a private
property in the organized production and exchange of resources, and as such, it is a subset of the
more explanatory term "property."
4 See, e.g., Joachim Ragritz, LaggingProductivity in the East German Economy: Obstacles
to Fast Convergence, in COHESIVE GROWTH IN THE ENLARGING EUROLAND 94, 94 (Michael
Dauderstdt & Lothar Witte eds., 2001) (stating that prior to World War II, "the East German
region was highly industrialized and productivity reached more than 90 per cent of the level
achieved in the West German industrial sector").
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Article asserts that during the separation, virtually the only significant
difference affecting the economies of West and East Germany concerned the
broadly defined institution of property, which applied privately to production
in West Germany and publicly to production in East Germany, and that this
difference caused a vast disparity in per capita wealth between the two nations.
In other words, particular economic policies did not cause the wealth disparity
between the two nations; rather, it was caused by the difference in the nations'
legal foundations, specifically by the failure in East Germany to permit a
private property in the production of the goods and services that are the
measure of wealth. The discussion of property that follows does not and
should not be taken to maintain that a private property system is somehow
inherently more morally desirable than a public property system (or any other
system). This Article only argues that a private property system produces
more of whatever resources are adequately protected by a secure private
property right. In other words, the Article does not attempt to justify any
particular applications of property right, but merely explains the legal
conditions that are required, insofar as is known, for national wealth formation.
Legal scholars often regard the term "property" as too ambiguous for
meaningful usage,5 a view sufficiently pervasive to necessitate advancing a
singular understanding of property that is both historically and analytically
robust. Nations wishing to develop their economies need to grasp the essential
legal context that has framed economic success in prosperous nations rather
than adopting specific common law or civil law rules applying property to
particular resources. For this reason, this Article defines "property" as an
exclusionary legal relationship among persons (and between persons and the
state) with regard to limited resources6 and "private property" as the property
relationship as applied to individuals or groups in their private capacities rather
than to the state or to publicly common groups.7 Further, the limited resources
that are the objects to which property applies have a very broad, almost
unlimited range, and historically, the objects of property have included even
aspects of one's person, including how one expresses physical and mental
faculties in productive activities!
' See infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
7 See infra pp. 580-81.
' John Locke, James Madison, and John Stuart Mill all believed that people have a property
interest in themselves. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 27 (C.B.
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690) (asserting that one is "proprietor of his own
person"); 6 THE WRrrniGs OFJAMES MADISON 101 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) (observing that one
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Part H of this Article develops the essential understanding of private
property, focusing on property as an exclusionary right and establishing this
view through both history and analysis. Part III examines the increasing
evidence associating adequate private property systems with prosperity, and
it also briefly considers what factors do not significantly account for maximum
wealth creation. Part IV looks at the property systems underlying West and
East Germany. Part V considers economic data from West and East Germany
during separation and from the Federal Republic of Germany following
reunification, concluding that in greatest measure, the property systems of
West and East Germany accounted for the economic strength of the former and
the relative economic weakness of the latter, even as following reunification,
the property system of the Federal Republic of Germany has lifted the
territories of the former East Germany to near economic parity with the rest of
Germany.
H. THE MEANING OF PROPERTY
An appreciation of the foundational role of property in the economic
development of modem economies requires a definition of "property";
however, many legal scholars consider this term an elusive "chimera of an
entity,' '9 the meaning of which has disintegrated I° under the complexities of the
modem marketplace, leaving a multiplicity of property forms almost as infinite
in variety as a Sanskrit verb." For some of these commentators, property has
come to mean little more than relationships of power between the rich and the
has a "property in the free use of his faculties"); JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 371 (Ronald Winch ed., Penguin Classics 1988) (1848) (stating that property
encompasses "the right of each to his (or her) own faculties"). Although one may be tempted
to refer to the right that people have in themselves as "liberty," rather than "property," see, e.g.,
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 588-89 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that
"liberty [liberty to work] is the 'very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity' secured
by the Fourteenth Amendment"), both concepts-liberty and property-have an exclusionary
basis and can be conceived as two sides of the same coin; however, such a reduction is not
necessary for the thesis of this Article.
9 J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 1 (1997) (explaining the views of various
commentators).
10 See generally Thomas C. Grey, The Discentegration of Property, in PROPERTY 69 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., Nomos No. 22, 1980).
" See Francis S. Philbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV.
691, 696 (1938).
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poor, the "haves" and the "have nots.' 2 To the contrary, this Article asserts
not only that property is a keystone for understanding how the people of
nations become economically prosperous but also that the term has a relatively
straightforward essence.
The OxfordEnglish Dictionary (QED) gives the first definition of property
as the "condition of being owned or belonging to some person or persons,"13
i.e., ownership, and the second definition as "that which one owns; a thing or
things belonging to or owned by some person or persons."14 According to the
OED, this latter definition, which also includes the secondary variant meaning
of "a piece of land owned,"'" did not come into widespread usage until the
seventeenth century.' 6 It is in large measure this definition which makes it
difficult to grasp what it is about a legal system that maximizes conditions for
wealth production. Once it is accepted that property means ownership rather
than objects that one owns, much that adds perplexity to the subject vanishes.
When resources themselves are thought of as property, it becomes possible to
assert that the law grants the rich more "property" than the poor, leading to
debates about the justice and morality of such inequality. When property is
understood as a legal right, however, then all persons enjoy the same right,
even though some accumulate-primarily through their productive ef-
forts-more resources than others. Additionally, if objects themselves are
property, and people's attitudes vary regarding which objects constitute
property, then property has no fixed meaning. This Article maintains that the
most fruitful approach is to regard the meaning of "property," a legal right, as
constant and fixed, although acknowledging that the objects or resources to
which property applies vary somewhat over time. This approach allows
nations to appreciate that how they apply a fixed legal right to resources
determines whether or not conditions are being set for maximum production
of those resources.
12 E.g., JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALIsM 260 (1990) (maintaining that property "hides a structure of power and
insulates it from democratic debate"); Kenneth R. Minogue, The Concept of Property and Its
Contemporary Significance, in PROPERTY, supra note 10, at 3, 5 (asserting that property "often
seems... a form of power that allows us to exploit other people").
13 THE COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2327 (1971).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
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The concept of property arises because resources-anything that people
may need or want-are limited at any point in time, 7 making it advantageous
to have a system both for determining the allocation of limited resources and
for encouraging the new production of resources. The limited resources
themselves, however, are not most meaningfully conceived as property;
"property" is the law of ownership that identifies who gets what and that gives
incentive to new resource production. Over the past century, the resources that
people need and want have become increasingly conceptual in nature.' 8 For
example, land, perhaps the most basic resource, historically supported labor-
intensive activities of simple farming, manufacturing, and living, but now is
used increasingly for the information-based, resource-generating activities of
modem economics. Relatively little land goes into producing the silicon chips
that enable computers, new drugs that cure disease, hardy hybrid seeds, or
financial products of all kinds. What produces these new resources is
predominantly mental rather than physical labor. 9 Nevertheless, while the
types of resources, both physical and information-based, have proliferated in
the last several centuries, the nature of property-the right of ownership-has
not changed in its essential meaning but only in its application, usually at the
cusp of new resource development. Although the types of tangible and
intangible resources used by nations have proliferated greatly over the last few
centuries, the operational concept of property under which the resources are
allocated among persons has remained arguably constant.
This constant essence of property is still difficult to grasp, however, if
ownership is specified in terms of possession, use, and disposition-terms
often used to describe a "bundle of rights" that owners have in their
resources.2" The "bundle of rights" language causes confusion because if
" It is important to emphasize that resources are limited only at a point in time. Over time,
the available resources that people need and want are almost unlimited, and thus generation of
the greatest wealth comes primarily from nations with an adequate framework for promoting
production of new resources rather than from nations aggregating to themselves a disproportion-
ate share of truly limited resources.
"S Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, Remarks at the 2003 Financial Markets
Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (Apr. 4, 2003), http://www.federalreserve.
gov/BoardDocs/speechs/2003/20030404/default.htm ("In recent decades.., the fraction of the
total output of our economy that is essentially conceptual rather than physical has been rising.").
" For example, U.S. economic growth does not depend significantly on raw materials
development. Alan Greenspan observed: "Over the past half century, the increase in the value
of raw materials has accounted for only a [small] fraction of the overall growth of U.S. gross
domestic product." Id.
20 The "bundle of rights" (or, altematively, bundle of "sticks," in which the sticks are
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possession, use, and disposition rights are all required for property ownership
to exist, then when one of the rights is missing, what is left? If possessors
cannot dispose themselves of bald eagle feathers or prescription drugs, do they
have no property right in these resources? Should the law characterize an
easement over land, which involves no possession of the land at all, as
property? When the state limits uses of land, is the state taking property? If
lessees have legal possession of apartments, do they own them? Do bailments
convey a property interest? What is the nature of the holding in a trust?
Most of these property conundrums are artifacts of legal language and
create perplexity primarily when property is thought of as an object or as
various rights. If property is viewed not as an object or a bundle of rights but
as a single negative right-the right of legal exclusion 2 1-the conundrums are
largely, if not totally, resolved, and the property system as a mechanism for
ordering and generating resources becomes much clearer. When property is
regarded as the legal right of exclusion over resources, then owners can control
the resources, use them, or dispose of them. Generally speaking, owners can
do anything with their resources that does not trespass on or infringe upon the
resources of other owners, including the state. When people can legally
exclude others from some resource, then possession, use, and disposition of
that resource become resources themselves, things that other people might
want or need, which owners can legally prevent others from interfering with,
infringing upon, or trespassing on, and which become objects to which the
exclusionary right applies rather than being property themselves.2 The legal
property "rights") analysis of property possibly dates to 1888. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER,
COMMODITY& PROPRIETY 455 n.40 (1997) (citing the usage in JOHN LEWIS,ATREATISE ONTHE
LAW OF EMINENT DoMAIN43 (1888)). The U.S. Supreme Court first used "bundle of rights" in
reference to property in 1937. Steward Machine Co. v. Davies, 301 U.S. 548, 581 (1937)
("Indeed, ownership itself... is only a bundle of rights and privileges invested with a single
name.").
2 As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes asserted, "Property depends upon exclusion by law
from interference." Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes,
J., dissenting); see also Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 673 (1999) ("The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude
others."). For an extensive examination of the exclusion thesis, see Thomas W. Merrill, Essay,
Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730 (1998); Reed, supra note 2, at 684-90;
cf PENNER, supra note 9, at 72 (maintaining that the "exclusion thesis is a statement of the
driving analysis of property in legal systems"). Contra Adam Mossoff, What is Property?
Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 396 (2003) (arguing that exclusion is
merely "the formal means by which Anglo-American legal rules identify and protect the
substantive core ofrights [the rights of acquisition, use, and disposal] that constitute property").
2 The exclusionary boundaries ofproperty apply not only to the physical contours ofobjects
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essence of property systems is the right of exclusion. To the extent and only
to the extent that people can exclude others from something do they have
property in it.23 Therefore, referring to property as a bundle of rights when the
single right of exclusion encompasses the entire bundle is unnecessary and
needlessly confusing, 4 especially when explaining the concept of property to
those who do not grasp the salutary economic effect that a system of
exclusionary right can have on a developing economy.
That the right to exclude others constitutes the essence of property has deep
roots both historically and analytically. Property has always concerned
drawing exclusionary boundaries around resources and having the legal
expectation that the state will protect owners from trespass, theft, and
robbery.25 Importantly, however, the concept of property as premised on legal
exclusion does not explain precisely which resources are the object of the
exclusionary right. Property systems in prosperous nations usually allow
people an exclusionary right over whatever they can acquire-including the
increase from production and sale-without trespassing on the equal property
but also to various actions that an owner can take. Professor Thomas W. Merrill recognizes,
"[Ilf one starts with the right to exclude, it is possible to derive most of the attributes [such as
possession, use, and disposition] commonly associated with property through the addition of
relatively minor clarifications about the domain of the exclusive right." Merrill, supra note 21,
at 740; cf. LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHiLosoPmc FOUNDATIONS 19 (1977)
("The right to possess ... may be understood... simply as the right to exclude others from the
use or other benefits of the thing.").
23 Merrill, supra note 21, at 730 ("Give someone the right to exclude others from valued
resources... and you give them property. Deny someone the exclusion right and they do not
have property.").
24 The purpose for defining "property" as the right of exclusion is not to convince common
law scholars that this definition explains every vagary of centuries-old legal language. This
Article merely asserts that exclusionary right is the identifiable essence of property which
elucidates what it is about legal systems that provides the maximum framework for generating
the greatest wealth of nations.
25 Boundary trespasses to all resources "proper" to one or some persons but not every person
constitute the central civil wrong in Western legal systems, as illustrated in Frederic W.
Maitland's observation that trespass is the "fertile mother of actions." FREDERIC W. MAITLAND,
THE FoRMs OF ACTION AT COMMoN LAW 48 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., Univ. Press
1965) (1909). As for theft and robbery, the very earliest compilations of law, such as the Code
of Hammurabi and the Biblical Ten Commandments, protect owners from these central criminal
wrongs. See, e.g., 2 THE BABYLONIAN LAWS 17,21 (G.R. Driver & John C. Miles eds. & trans.,
1955); Vernon L. Smith, Speech at the Nobel Banquet (Dec. 10, 2002), http://nobelprize.org/
economics/laureates!2002/smith-speech.html (asserting that "[tihe ancient Judeo Command-
ments: Thou shalt not steal or covet the possessions of thy neighbor ... provide the property
right foundations for markets").
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right of others, including acquisition through first possession, exchange,
accession, confusion, and gift. In light of the vast numbers of actual and
potential resourceful objects, the precise contour of property boundaries in
resources is virtually always a matter of some dispute in society, but the
property system works because most people know most of the time what
constitutes a trespass against what others own and thus refrain from trespass-
ing. Law enforcement authorities and courts exist to protect property
boundaries, to compensate owners for occasional injurious infringements
(generally to the economic value of a resource), and to resolve issues of
uncertain boundaries, often with regard to the uses that owners make of their
resources.
All societies recognize some applications of private property to resources.
For instance, the Constitution of the former Soviet Union guaranteed the
private property right of citizens as applied to personal items,26 and this right
was enforced by Soviet anti-theft laws. What the Soviet Union-and socialism
generally-prohibited was private property in the use of resources for
production and exchange. The Soviet state held a public property in the
resources of production and exchange, meaning that the state had an exclusive
monopoly over organized manufacturing. Even very primitive societies with
extensive forced sharing of resources usually allow some private property; for
example, they permit hunters an exclusive right to their bows.27
A comprehensive system based on private exclusionary right is absent,
however, in much of the world. In many of the world's poorer nations,
endemic corruption at all levels of the state renders daunting any effective
systemic change based on the equal exclusionary right of all under the rule of
law. In addition to the corruption, these nations often erect substantial legal
barriers against the use of resources productively, for example, by imposing
prohibitive business licensing requirements," thus effectively denying people
26 PETER STEIN & JOHN SHAND, LEGAL VALUES IN WESTERN SOCIETY 216 (1974) (quoting
the Soviet Constitution of 1936: "[T]he personal property right of citizens in their incomes and
savings from work, in their dwelling houses and subsidiary home enterprises, in articles of
domestic economy and use and articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of
citizens to inherit personal property, is protected by law"). The East German Constitution
likewise guaranteed a limited private property in resources. See infra notes 93-103 and
accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., James Woodburn, SharingIs Not a Form ofExchange: An Analysis ofProperty-
Sharing in Immediate Return Hunter-Gatherer Societies, in PROPERTY RELATIONS: RENEWING
THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TRADITION 48, 53 (C.M. Hann ed., 1998).
2 See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
SUCCEEDS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000) (examining the economically
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a property in the productive use of their resources. Poor nations also tend to
lack adequate law enforcement for protecting owners' resources and fair and
impartial mechanisms such as courts for resolving boundary disputes and
awarding compensation for various trespasses.2 9 Path dependence can make
it easy or difficult for nations to implement property systems adequate to the
task of alleviating poverty by giving incentive to the maximum generation of
wealth, but whether easy or not, the creation of stable exclusionary right
systems are arguably necessary to sustain conditions conducive to modem
productive economies, as the following section illustrates.
III. EVIDENCE OF PROPERTY'S PRIMARY CONTRIBUTION TO
WEALTH CREATION
Several hundred years ago the nations of the world were almost all
uniformly impoverished.3 ° Larger nations with superior military force may
have conquered smaller nations and appropriated their easily moveable
resources, but the wealth advantages thus provided did not substantially raise
general living standards in the larger countries, certainly not for long. For
instance, in many ways, the material living standards of the average European
colonist arriving in the New World were no higher than those of the Native
Americans whom they conquered."
deleterious effect of the state imposing substantial licensing roadblocks to the use of resources
for business purposes in a private property context). Perhaps more than anyone else, de Soto has
helped bring public attention to the adequate institution of property as the primary institution
supporting maximum economic development in poor nations.
29 See, e.g., Christopher Clague et al., Institutions and Economic Performance: Property
Rights and Contract Performance, in INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 67, 80
(Christopher Clague ed., 1997) (asserting that lack of adequate property and contract
enforcement "are an important part of the explanation of why some countries prosper while
others do not").
30 See, e.g., Douglas C. North, CentennialLecture: Why Some Countries Are Rich and Some
Are Poor, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 319,320 (2001) (stating that "[f]ive or six hundred years ago,
everyone was poor by present standards, but the difference between countries was much
smaller").
"' For evidence that theNew World (Western Hemisphere) was more populated and arguably
even richer than Europe, see generally JAMES WILSON, THE EARTH SHALL WEEP: A HISTORY OF
NATIVE AMERICA (1998). Consider as specific evidence of European living standards that
France, one of Europe's wealthier nations, suffered forty-seven "general famines" from 1400 to
1700. 1 FERNAND BRAUDEL, THE STRUCTURES OF EVERYDAY LIFE: CIVILIZATION AND
CAPITALISM, 15TH-18TH CENTURY 74 (1981).
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Today, however, a significant fraction of the world's nations enjoy many
times the per capita incomes of most other countries, a phenomenon related to
the emergence in those prosperous nations of property systems that encourage
rather than suppress private activities that produce new resources which people
want and need. In the studies here summarized, the term "property" is not
precisely defined, but the concept of property should invariably be taken to
refer to an exclusionary right such that the owners' boundaries extend only to
resources-including resources of possession, use, and disposition-from
which they can legally exclude others. To conclude otherwise is largely to
conflate the right of ownership with the resources which are owned, an
approach that has little explanatory power for helping nations which lack
adequate private exclusionary systems to understand what it is about
prosperous economies that sets the strongest foundation for new resource
production.
A 2004 study measuring the economic impact of property protection finds
that from 1980 to 2000 for the approximately 100 countries for which statistics
were available, the top twenty-four countries with the highest protection of
property averaged $25,716 per capita whereas the twenty-one countries with
the lowest such protection averaged $3094 per capita.32 In considering this
evidence, notice two further points. First, an additional 100 or so countries for
which statistics were not available likely furnished their citizens an even
weaker property right than those averaging $3094 of per capita income. It has
been estimated that "[h]alf the world's people still live on less than $2 a day,"33
or under $800 per capita annually.
Second, note that the authors of the 2004 study specifically attributed
higher per capita incomes not only to "protection of property rights" but also
to "unbiased enforcement of contracts, independence of the judiciary, and the
rule of law."34 Because this Article considers (1) the enforcement of how
owners exchange resources (contract), (2) the separation of institutions that
judge property infringements and detenmine property boundaries (independent
judiciary) from more political branches of government, and (3) a general and
equal legal opportunity (rule of law) to acquire property-protected resources
simply to be features of an adequate property system, the Article reasonably
32 JAMES GWARTNEY & ROBERT LAWSON, ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 2004
ANNUAL REPORT 36 (2004), http://www.freetheworld.com/2004/efw2004complete.pdf.
3 President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Inter-American Development Bank (Mar. 14,
2002), in 38 WKLY. COMPILATION OF PREs. Docs. 419,420, available at http://www.gpoaccess.
gov/wcomp.v38no I 1.html.
34 GWARTNEY & LAWSON, supra note 32, at 36.
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attributes all of these multiple features to that single system. Indeed, a 2002
study recognized that "economic freedom," which is what the authors mean by
the presence of these multiple features, is equivalent to "property rights
protection, broadly conceived."3
Another study found that between 1985 and 1995, in those nations where
the property right strengthened most, the annual gross national product (GNP)
grew at an annual rate of 2.9%, but in those nations where the property right
weakened most, GNP averaged a 1.9% annual decline.36 If a property system
applied to private productive activities outperforms a system that does not
adequately protect such production by only 2% annually, in 34.5 years the
former system has doubled the production of the latter and in a little over 200
years has a sixty-four-fold greater production. Most ofthe world's prosperous
nations have framed their economies with strong property systems for between
150 to 300 years, powerfully suggesting why these nations have far wealthier
economies than poorer countries. A 1988 analysis of all studies then extant
determined that stronger, property-based economies grew at three times the
annual rate of weaker such economies.37
Although some critics principally associate the effects of a private property
system with protection of the resources of the rich,38 the most salient economic
and social result of a private property system that protects land ownership and
the production and exchange of resources may be on the totality of resources
enjoyed by the poor.39 The income of the poorest 10% of the population in
nations with the strongest private property protection is "much greater" than
it is in nations with the weakest recognition and enforcement of ownership. 0
35 GERALD P. O'DRisCoLL, JR. ET AL., 2002 INDEX OF ECONOMIC FREEDOM 37 (2002).
36 JAMES GWARTNEY & ROBERT LAWSON, ECONOMIC FREEDOM OF THE WORLD: 1977
ANNUAL REPORT 34 (1997).
17 Gerald W. Sully, The Institutional Framework and Economic Development, 96 J. POL.
ECON. 952, 952 (1988).
38 Clague et al., supra note 29, at 80 (asserting that "[tihere is a widespread perception that
secure property rights and effective contract enforcement benefit primarily the rich").
39 See, e.g., TOM BETHELL, THE NOBLEST TRIUMPH: PROPERTY AND PROSPERITY THROUGH
THE AGES 202 (1998) (maintaining that if property laws are applied generally and equally "they
will work above all to the advantage of the poor"); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE 210 (1997) (stating that "property rights create wealth" and that "[t]ime and
again it has been shown that economic growth can do more than welfare and employment
programs to benefit the disadvantaged"). That the adequate legal institution of private property
will unleash economic growth for the poor is the basis for the approach taken in DE SOTO, supra
note 28.
" Clague et al., supra note 29, at 83-84.
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A billion people in the world-almost all of them in weak private property
nations-survive on a dollar a day or less, $365 annually,4 when the official
poverty level for an individual in the United States-a strong private property
nation-is over $9000 a year,42 more than twenty-five times as much, an
enormously significant economic difference even allowing for variations
between buying power in the United States and other countries due to costs of
living. Perhaps this substantial difference in relative poverty levels is best
summed by the statement attributed to an Indian youth: " 'I am going to move
to America,' he vowed. 'I want to live in a country where the poor people are
fat.' 743
The association between a certain kind of property system and economic
prosperity, including relative prosperity for the poor in such a system, might
be merely correlational, not causative, yet analyses of other suggested causes
for the dramatic differences in economic well-being between rich and poor
nations have been largely and convincingly discounted. Greater natural
resources, superior education and technology, ideal population densities, a
history of colonial abuses, and trade aggrandizement do not appear to be
substantially responsible for the greater wealth of some nations as contrasted
with others." Nor is the laissez-faire private market alone or coupled with
financial sector development and high rates of investment in equipment and
machinery adequate to establish maximum conditions for sustained national
wealth generation. 5 Following the collapse of the former Soviet Union and
"' Gregg Easterbrook, Safe Deposit: The Case for Foreign Aid, NEW REPUBLIC, July 29,
2002 (recognizing that 1.2 billion people in the world live on a dollar or less per day).
42 Lynette Clemetson, More Americans in Poverty in 2002, Census StudySays, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 2003 (citing the U.S. Census standard for measuring individual poverty in the United
States).
41 DINESH D'SouzA, THE VIRTUE OF PROSPERITY 75 (2000).
44 See generally TIMOTHY J. YEAGER, INSTITUTIONS, TRANSITION ECONOMIES, AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 16-17 (1999) (explaining why internal economies rather than the trade
aggrandizement asserted by "dependency theory" causes countries to become wealthy or to
remain poor); Clague et al., supra note 29, at 81-83 (giving examples of why education is not
a key to understanding national economic development); Transcript of Federal Reserve
Chairman Alan Greenspan's Answer to Senate Finance Committee Member Charles Schumer,
THE MAIN WIRE, Feb. 12, 2004 (stating that natural resources are a "very minor" cause of
national economic prosperity); Reed, supra note 2, at 676-83; Mancur Olson, Jr., Distinguished
Lecture on Economics in Government, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (1996).
" In the modern prosperous nation, a successful private market, financial institutions like
banking and securities exchanges, and the potential for substantial equipment investment become
possible only after an adequate property-based legal system is in place.
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the subsequent creation in Russia of a private market unsupported by an
adequate property system, the economy declined 41% in the next seven years.46
Path dependence-the social, political, and legal inertia engendered by
cultural beliefs and habits-certainly affects national economic outcomes,47
but in relation to the potential for economic prosperity, path dependence
simply indicates that specific cultural paths raise or lower the costs of
enforcing a property-based legal system, rather than suggesting that some
alternative system might outperform an adequate system of exclusionary right.
When cultural beliefs, for example, support obedience to law and hard work,
as they did in Japan at the end of World War II following General MacArthur's
institution of a modern property right in land,48 a property-based legal
framework for production will likely energize a moribund economy more
effectively and at less cost than when systemic political and legal corruption
has set a national population on a path that will make it difficult and costly to
implement and enforce a property system. Deep-seated religious and racial
conflicts can also doubtlessly erect obstacles to economic growth,49 even in
private property-based, well-enforced legal systems; however, it is the legal
property system protecting private resources rather than any particular set of
cultural (including religious) beliefs that seems to be required for catalyzing
the greatest economic growth.5" Nations desiring to develop their economies
should understand that they need to apply a stable right of private exclusion to
whatever broad spectrum of actual or potential resources they want to increase
46 DE SOTO, supra note 28, at 215.
" North, supra note 30, at 329-31. See generally CULTURE MATTERS: HOW VALUES SHAPE
HUMAN PROGRESS (Lawrence E. Harrison & Samuel P. Huntington eds., 2000).
41 Peruvian economist Hemando de Soto has referred to General MacArthur's property-
titling program in post-war Japan, which ended the largely feudal land system and unleashed
Japanese economic growth, as "magnificent." Liam Halligan & Phillip Carter, Business Focus,
SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), June 6, 2004.
49 See generally AMY CHuA, WORLD ON FIRE (2003).
50 Recent studies have associated the likelihood of national economic growth with certain
religious beliefs. See generally Robert J. Barro & Rachel M. McCleary, Religion andEconomic
Growth Across Countries, 68 AM. Socio. REV. 760 (2003); Luigi Guiso et al., People's Opium?
Religion and Economic Attitudes, 50 J. MONETARY EcoNoMics 225 (2003). Certainly, the type
of path dependence associated with religious attitudes supporting cooperation with others,
obedience to law, thriftiness, and respect for authority contribute to lower transaction costs in
implementing enforcement of a property-based legal system; however, it is the adequate, secular
exclusionary right, rather than any particular religion, that generates the greatest potential for
economic growth. For example, predominately Christian Mexico is relatively poor economically
whereas the predominately Christian United States is relatively wealthy economically.
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and recognize that path dependence does not obviate the necessity for
achieving this.
Why a system of private exclusionary right produces more than a system,
for instance, under which people are expected to produce according to their
abilities and share according to community needs may be connected to
something quite deep in human nature concerning human mating practices and
the inordinately long developmental period of human children that requires
substantial contributions of parental resources.5 Whatever the reason that
seems to make a private exclusionary right to acquire, hold, and develop new
resources more effective in creating wealth than other known methods, it is a
prime tenet of economics that people act consistently in their self-interest, 2
and it does not require a big leap to grasp that a system of exclusionary right
gives incentive to productive effort by ensuring that self-interested producers
can control what they produce. When it is further understood that economies
are not lifeboats requiring a fair method for dividing up ever dwindling
supplies of resources but open-ended resource comucopias dependent for
producing new wealth primarily on abundant inputs of willing human efforts,
it becomes more evident why it is desirable for nations concerned with raising
per capita incomes to give maximum incentive to those efforts through the
exclusionary right. Individuals or individual groups that produce more than
they can consume must trade in order to further benefit themselves, but in
trading under conditions of competition, they will unavoidably benefit the
common economic good as measured in terms of a greater per capita quantity
and/or quality of resources that are available at overall lower prices. The
private property system that gives maximum incentive to production brings
additional economic benefit not only to those producing new resources but to
society overall.
" For an extended discussion of this view of evolutionary psychology, see Reed, supra note
2, at 701-06. The thesis that the economic success of an exclusionary right system is tied to
evolutionarily manifested human behavior is for good reason highly controversial. It is
nonetheless consistent with all of the evidence that humans will actively produce more across
the broad spectrum of modem economies when they privately control the resources produced.
Of course, cooperation, compassion, and sharing should be encouraged in society, but these
admirable human behaviors do not seem to be enough to produce wealthy nations without the
addition of a well-enforced institution of exclusionary right.
2 E.g., North, supra note 30, at 324 (stating that "[i]n economies we assume everyone is
rational. By rational, in the pure sense, we mean that people know what is in their self-interest
and act accordingly.").
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General studies establishing the economic advantages of a legal system
premised on a broadly applied and enforced exclusionary right in productive
resources are important but also significant are specific national accounts of
the link between property and prosperity. No better national illustration of this
link exists or is likely to exist than in the case of Germany, a nation that was
economically devastated at the end of World War 11, divided into two countries
by the victorious Allies, then reunited after forty years. In the case of West
and East Germany, the excellence of the illustration lies in the fact that prior
to their division, the peoples of Germany were of common language, culture,
law, education, and economic situation, including access to material resources,
agriculture, and health services. After the division, virtually the only
significant change that occurred lay in the legal (and related political) nature
of the respective property-based systems that founded the economies of West
and East Germany. Now, some fifteen years after the reunification of
Germany, the economic effects of the division and reunification in terms of
applying property to productive resources can be examined.
The following sections discuss the property systems in West and East
Germany and focus on the economic impact on the people of the former East
Germany of incorporation into the Federal Republic of Germany, under a legal
system that strongly applies and enforces property rights in productive
resources. Throughout the discussion, note that the term "private property"
refers to the legal right to exclude others, including in most instances the state
itself, from a wide array of both tangible and intangible limited resources, not
the least of which are the resourceful actions that owners take in relation to
their other resources. For the purposes of the subsequent discussion, property
is a right, not the object of the right, and only to the precise extent that owners
have a right to exclude others from a given object do they have a property in
it.
IV. THE PROPERTY SYSTEMS OF WEST GERMANY AND EAST GERMANY
Prior to the political division of Germany in 1947, the territories of East and
West Germany were one Germany subject to one set of laws, laws which
traced their origins to the Roman codes.53 The German adaptation of Roman
" Otto Kringe, Dingliche Rechte [Property Law], in DAS ZIVLRECHT IN BEIDEN DEUTSCHEN
STAATEN-UNTERSCHIEDE, PARALLELENENTWICKLUNG, VERGLEICH [CIviL LAW IN BOTH
GERMAN STATES-DFERENCE, PARALLEL DEVELOPMENT, COMPARISON] 171, 182 (Gottfried
Zieger & Klaus Westen eds., 1988) [hereinafter ZIvLRECHT] ("Property law in the Civil Code
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law, specifically the adherence to the Romans' strong conception of property,54
was consistent with prevailing trends in Europe, as reflected in Article 17 of
the 1789 French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Section 164 of the 1849
Frankfurt Constitution. The drafters of these documents, following in the
traditions established by legal scholars in the Age of Enlightenment, under-
stood the connection between property and liberty and integrated this concept
into their works.55 The Constitution of Germany [Grundgesetz (GG)] is based
on the principles of civil liberty and equal property rights for all and provides
a broad exclusionary right to property owners, while allowing free and
beneficial use of resources, subject to reciprocal rights of third parties. 6
However, the Soviet occupation of East Germany meant that the property law
of East Germany was influenced by Soviet legal principles,57 especially as they
applied to the production and distribution of new resources. A break was made
from the liberal Civil Code [Brgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)], part of the West
German legislative code, towards the more restrictive socialist Civil Code
[Zivilgesetzbuch (ZGB)], part of the East German code of laws, to comport
with the political realities in the East." Property law in East Germany began
to differentiate between social production resources and private consumption
resources, a distinction which did not exist in West Germany. 9 The following
section has the limited goal of demonstrating selected constitutional and
statutory provisions, emphasizing that whereas West Germans enjoyed the
private property right applied to production and distribution, East Germans did
derives from Roman law without substantial modification.").
14 THEODORMAUNZ& GUNTERDURIG, GRUNDGESETZ: KOMMENTAR LOSEBLATTSAMMLUNG
[CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY, LOOSELEAF COLLECTION], lfg. 22, art. 14, m. 18 ff fn. 10, p.
20 (1983).
Because the editors expect that the German sources in this Article primarily will be
utilized by German-speaking researchers, the citations of certain sources are in the format used
in German practice, with the exception of sources for which The Bluebook provides a format.
See THE 13LUEBOOK 151-55, 262-65 (17th ed. 2000).
s MAUNZ & GfTNTER DORIG, supra note 54.
56 SeegenerallyGRUNDGESETZ[GG] [Constitution] (F.R.G.). TheNational Socialists briefly
refocused German law, placing the interest of the collective above the interest of the individual.
See KARL HEINZ SCHWAB & HANS PROTTrING, SACHENRECHT [PROPERTY LAW] 133 (2002).
" See generally R.O. C-ALFINA, DAS PERSONLICHE EIGENTUM IN DER UDSSR [PERSONAL
PROPERTY iN THE USSR] (1976).
" Norbert Jakob, Die neuer Entwicklung des Zivilrechts in beiden deutschen Staaten [The
Recent Development of Civil Law in Both German States], in ZlVtLRECHT, supra note 53, at 1,
8.
59 Kringe, supra note 53, at 185.
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not, and that this disparity constitutes the basis of the per capita wealth
differential between the two German states.6°
A. Property Law in the Federal Republic of Germany
The law of the Federal Republic of Germany employs a broad conception
of private property in general and in production in particular,61 the root of
which lies in Article 14 of the German Constitution.62 In a fundamental
decision, the Federal Constitutional Court stated:
Property is an elementary basic right, which is closely linked to
the guarantee of personal freedom. In the framework of basic
rights, the function of property rights is to insure their bearer a
degree of freedom of action and thereby enable him to shape his
life in a self-reliant manner. The constitutional guarantee of the
legal institution of property serves to secure these basic rights.63
The German scholar GOnter Dfirig calls property "objectified liberty."'
Professor Klaus Westen sees the foundation of the law of the Federal Republic
of Germany in "private autonomy," comprised of freedom of property, freedom
of contract, and freedom of commerce.65 Professors Karl Heinz Schwab and
Hans Priitting describe property as the foundation of the economic and social
60 See Klaus Westen, Funktion, Inhalt und Schranken des Zivilrechts in beiden deutschen
Staaten [Function, Content, and Limitation of the Civil Law in Both German States], in
ZIVlURECHT, supra note 53, at 15, 30 ("The GDR itself, with its conception of civil law, created
certain impediments and obstacles to a more open and variable economic policy.").
61 See ERNST R. FORICH, WIRTSCHAFTSPRIVATRECHT [BusiNEss CIVIL LAW] 235 (2001).
6' Article 14 states: "(1) Property and inheritance are guaranteed. Contents and limitations
are given by law. (2) Property creates obligation. Its use is subject to public welfare. (3) Taking
by eminent domain is lawful for a public purpose." GG art. 14. Thus, Article 14 has the dual
purpose of guaranteeing the integrity of private property as well as protecting private property
from interference by private third parties and the government. RoLF SCHMIDT, GRUNDRECHTE
[CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW] 393 (2004).
63 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BuNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICrrs [BverfGiE] [Federal Constitutional
Court] 24, 367 (389) (F.R.G.).
"Ginter Drig, Verfassungsrechtliche Eigentumsgarantien [Constitutional Guarantees of
Property], in 2 STAATSLEXIKON [STATE ENCYCLOPEDIA] 1080 (1958) ("vergegenstindlichte
Freiheit").
65 Westen, supra note 60, at 18 (stating that there are "fundamentally no limits to the
freedom [to own]").
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order, as well as essential personal development and private autonomy.66 The
opinions of these scholars, taken together with the view of the Federal
Constitutional Court, make it clear that property is a right with a dual
character. Property both encourages persons as owners to make a living by
using private resources directly for personal and economic gain and guarantees
such owners space for action free from the intervention of third parties.67 A
relatively free use of resources protected by the right of exclusion is the
cornerstone of successful capitalist societies, and is limited principally by the
exclusionary right of others. A "proper" exclusionary right is the foundation
of the chain of production and enables owners to reap the fruits of their
entrepreneurial efforts. The German Constitution as interpreted by the courts
recognizes the importance of this right.
Because property is a broad right, it is not defined by inclusion of
appurtenant rights, but instead is delimited by specific exceptions,68 i.e., if the
legislature has not declared a specific limitation, the existence of the
exclusionary right must be assumed.69 In the Federal Republic of Germany,
the property right is most easily abridged when a social purpose such as
eminent domain can be formulated,7" with eminent domain predicated upon a
finding of public benefit.71 Public welfare limitations on the use of resources
are contemplated in the constitutional guarantee of property.72
Beyond Article 14 of the German Constitution, property rights are limited
by a number of laws. For example, section 903 of the BGB, allows the owner
of a thing to "use it as he pleases and exclude others from all influence."73 The
rights granted by section 903 are often described as rights of complete
dominion,74 subject only to limits on ownership rights imposed by "other laws
and the rights of third parties."7 The BGB, like the German Constitution,
stands out with its clear and broad language, and Otto Kringe opines that
private autonomy is the hallmark of the BGB.76 The limitation placed on
66 SCHWAB& PROTTING, supra note 56, at 134, 135.
" Kringe, supra note 53, at 171 (citing BVerfGE 24, 367 (389)).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.; see also GG art. 14, para. 2 (Begrenzung der Sozialbindung).
71 SCHMIDT, supra note 62, at 393; Kringe, supra note 53, at 171. Eminent domain strongly
suggests that although property is an individual right, its purpose is general social benefit.
72 GG art. 14; SCHMIDT, supra note 62, at 393.
73 BuRGERLICHEs GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code] § 903 (F.R.G.).
" Kringe, supra note 53, at 173.
71 § 903 BGB.
76 Kringe, supra note 53, at 173.
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ownership by the rights of third parties is to be expected and is not incompati-
ble with the broad guarantees of Article 14 and section 903, since a system of
exclusionary right can come to full fruition only if the rights of all holders are
afforded the same recognition under law. Other limitations refining the
application of the exclusionary right, for example in sections 904,77 910,78 and
22671 of the BGB; building and zoning codes; and environmental protection
laws80 protect the rights of remote third parties.
Section 903 only applies to tangibles,8 but a number of other statutes cover
a great variety of intangible ownership interests.82 For example, interests in the
nature of debts, such as mortgages, unsecured debts on land, and debts on
personal property are covered by sections such as section 1204 of the BGB.
Freedom of construction is guaranteed and arises from the German Constitu-
tion.83 Patents, copyrights, and trademarks are likewise protected.84 Private
ownership also applies to causes of action,85 hunting licenses, 6 leases,87 and
the right to run a business.88 Owners are granted broad recovery rights for
infringements and violations of their exclusive interests,89 and the enforcement
of property interests is ensured by an adequate number of attorneys9" and a
71 § 904 BGB (creating in non-owners privileged emergency use rights).
78 § 910 BGB (governing the rights of owners of neighboring land).
79 § 226 BGB (prohibiting the use of rights in general for fraud).
8 Kringe, supra note 53, at 171.
81 OTTO PALANDT, BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [CIVIL CODE] § 903 (64th ed. 2005).
Things, as the object of property and covered by section 903 of the BGB, have to be spatially
delimited; air, flowing water, groundwater, rain, snow, light, electricity, uninstalled computer
programs, the living human body, and customer lists are examples of resources not covered by
section 903 of the BGB. Id. §§ 90.1, 90.2; RG 86, 14 MueKo/Holch rn 20; BoRMANN/
BORMANN DB 91, 2642; Redecker NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENTLICH [NJW] [NEW LEGAL
WEEKLY] 92, 1739; JUNKER, NWJ 93, 2437; KARLSR NJW 96, 201; AA MOLLER-
HENGSTENBERG NJW 94, 3129.
82 GG art. 14; SCHMIDT, supra note 62, at 395. See generally DIETER SCHWAB, EINFOHRUNG
IN DAS ZIVIRECHT [INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL LAW] 147 (11 th ed. 1993).
83 GG art. 14; SCHMIDT, supra note 62, at 395.
84 See BVerfGE NJW 1999, 2880 (2881); BVerfGE NJW 2001, 1784.
85 BVerfGE 92, 262 (272).
86 BUNDESGERICHTSHOF [BGH] [Supreme Court] NJW 2000, 3638 ff.
87 BVergGE 89, 1 (6-7).
88 GG art. 14; SCHMIDT, supra note 62, at 396; SCHWAB, supra note 82, at 165.
89 § 823 BGB ("A person, who intentionally, or negligently [i.e., recklessly or carelessly],
unlawfully injuries the life, body, health, freedom, property or other right of another is bound
to compensate him for any damage arising therefrom.").
90 Germany has 100 lawyers per 100,000 inhabitants. By comparison, the United States has
230, England and Canada 130, Italy eighty and France fifty-five lawyers per 100,000 inhabitants.
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well-developed judiciary.9 Like the United States and other prosperous
nations, the Federal Republic of Germany recognizes and adequately enforces
a broad exclusionary right in the production and distribution of new resources.
B. Property Law in East Germany
Based on Marxist philosophy,92 the property law structure in East Germany
differed markedly from that in the Federal Republic of Germany, 93 and the
Constitution of East Germany marked a broad departure from the property
right established under the Constitution of Germany and the BGB. The
preamble of the East German Constitution stated that "the German Democratic
Republic is a socialist state of workers and farmers."94 In Articles 9, 10, and
11, the East German Constitution created a clear division between social
property (the equivalent of public property) and private property. Article 9(1)
provided that "the economy ... is based on social property in the means of
production." 95 In Article 10, the East German Constitution declared that social
property represented collective ownership by the people, although only the
state and not the individual could direct the use of and own the profit from
socially-owned resources.96 Private property applied to non-productive
resources was permitted by Article 1 ." Articles 12 and 13 included means
of production and transportation in the definition of social property and
UWE WESEL, RISIKO RECHTSANWALT (RISK: LAWYERS] 62 (2001).
9z Germany has 270 judges per million inhabitants. By comparison, the United States and
England only have eighty judges per million inhabitants. Id. at 21.
92 DIETER BIRK, DAS PERSONLICHE EIGENTUM DES BURGERS IN DER DDR [PERSONAL
PROPERTY OF CITIZENS OF THE GDR] 15 (1973); see also FRIEDRICH ENGELS, HERR EUGEN
DGHRINGS UMWALZUNG DER WISSENSCHAFT [MISTER EUGEN DOHRINGS' CHANGE OF SCIENCE]
160 (1948) (claiming that the balance of resource ownership can be recreated by disowning the
capitalists, the original disowners); MARTIN POSCH, ZUEINIGEN THEORETISCHEN GRUNDFRAGEN
DES SOZIALISTISCHEN ZIVILGESETZBUCHES [ABOUT CERTAIN THEORETICAL SOCIAL CIVIL LAW]
267 (1975) (stating that private property law in East Germany was supposed to mirror property
structures envisioned by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels).
" The following discussion is based on the Constitution of 1968 and the East German Civil
Code [Zivilgesetzbuch (ZGB)] of 1974, which were in effect at all relevant times before
unification.
9' VERFASSUNGDERDEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK [VERF] [Constitution] pmbl.
(1968) (G.D.R.).
95 VERF art. 9(1).
96 VER art. 10.
9' VERF art. 11.
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forbade private ownership of productive resources.98 Article 14 prohibited the
creation of unions or trade associations.99
The East German Constitution thus created two categories of property:
social and private.'00 While the East German Constitution applied social
property to the means of production, transportation, and distribution, there
were no specific guidelines as to which resources private property applied.
Article 1 1 merely stated that private property was to "satisfy the East German
material cultural needs of the citizenry."' m Looking beyond the Constitution
for a definition, the ZGB held in section 23 that private property applied to
wages and savings, among other resources.0 2 One thing, however, seems
relatively clear: social property and private property were not on an equal
footing, but were altogether distinct. 103
Social property was the basis of the state-planned East German economy.
Under the Constitution, as soon as resources were implicated in the production
process, they could not be privately acquired.'" The uses derived from social
property right were limited to serving the socialist planned economy in
supporting all citizens.'05 Socially-owned resources could not be the subject
of a mortgage or any other security interest,'0 6 and social resources were in
practice non-transferable because of a broad prohibition on private use and
ownership,0 7 although in rare cases, citizens were granted permission to use
socially-owned resources to build a dwelling or to plant a garden.'08
Private resources in East Germany were generally used in daily personal
life, but even so, private resources had to be used in accordance with social
requirements imposed by the state.0 9 The creation of mortgages and security
interests in private resources were proscribed, and sales were subject to price
guidelines set by law."' The Grundstuecksverkehrsverordung (GVVO)
"' VERF arts. 12-13.
99 VERF art. 14.
100 Westen, supra note 60, at 20 (stating that the private autonomy of East German citizens
in their property is limited to the non-productive use of resources).
101 VERF art. 11.
§ 23 ZGB.
103 Kringe, supra note 53, at 176.
104 Id. at 178.
oS §§ 18, 21 ZGB.
'0' § 20, para. 3 ZGB.
107 Id.
'08 See, e.g., § 287 ZGB.
109 § 284, para. 2 ZGB.
1 See, e.g., § 30 ZGB; Jakob, supra note 58, at 9-10. Jakob relates the case of an owner
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[Property Transfer Regulation],"' Wohnraumlenkungsverordnung (WLVO)
[Dwelling Directional Regulation], 2 and Gewerberaumlenkungsverordnung
(GewLVO) [Commercial Directional Regulation],' a-the codes of East
German law-contained an extensive catalogue of limitations on the use of
privately-owned resources. It was the goal of the licensing regimes instituted
by these laws to ensure that private use of private resources did not conflict
with overarching socialist goals. Under the GVVO, for example, transfers of
land or interests in land were to be denied if the transfer tended to concentrate
ownership in violation of social interests, 4 and if the local government unit
within which such private resources were located was granted a right of first
refusal over them." 5 Similar restraints on alienation were contained in the
WLVO and the GewLVO. In addition to these laws, rents were frozen by the
state at 1939 levels1 6 and the control of landlords over real estate was severely
curtailed." 7 Since the right to use and dispose of private resources was
severely curtailed, East German citizens merely enjoyed a possessory property
right in such resources. While actions in the nature of trespass existed to
enforce the possessory right,"' owners in East Germany were deprived of the
most beneficial property right granted in West Germany: the right to use
private resources for the generation of profit. If property is conceived as an
exclusionary right, one can say that the citizens of East Germany had no
property in the productive use of their private resources.
selling a house for 60,000 Mark despite the fact that the official appraised value was 22,350
Mark. Jakob, supra note 58, at 9-10. The seller was required to remit her profits to the state and
the buyer was given the option to rescind the transaction. Id.
1' VERORDNUNG UBER DEN VERKEHR MIT GRUNDSTUCKEN -
GRUNDSTUCKSVERKEHRSORDNUNG [GVVO] voM. 15. DEZEMBER 1977 [Regulation Concerning
the Transfer of Real Property of Dec. 15, 1977], GB1. 11978, No. 5 at 73.
112 WOHNRAUMLENKUNGSVERORDNUNG (WLVO) VOM. 16 OKTOBER 1985 [Regulation
Concerning Dwelling Directions of Oct. 16, 1985], GVB1. 1, 301; DB VOM. 16 OKTOBER 1985,
GVB1. I, 308.
"' GEWERBERAUMLENKUNGSVERORDNUNG (GewLVO) VOM. 6 FEBRUAR 1986 [Regulation
Concerning Commercial Directions of Feb. 6, 1986], GVB 1. I, 249.
1" § 3, para. 4, letters c, d GVVO.
15 § 1 IGVVO.
116 Kringe, supra note 53, at 180.
"7 Jakob, supra note 58, at 8. Dietmar Funke, Das Wohnungsmietrecht in beiden deutschen
Staaten [Landlord-Tenant Law in Both German States], in ZRIVLRECHT, supra note 53, at 79.
' Richard Motsch, Schadensersatz und ungerechtfertigte Bereicherung in den beiden
deutschen Staaten [Liability and Unjust Enrichment in Both German States, in ZIViLREcHT,
supra note 60, at 143.
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Absent a right of property in productive activity, there was no need for
extensive protection of intangible objects in East Germany. Without
competition from the private market framed by property, the application of
ownership to patents, copyrights, and trademarks was merely an academic idea
that did not have an impact on government-controlled markets. It is unclear
how well the laws of East Germany were enforced in general, 1 9 but one must
suspect that fear of the power of the state and secret police contributed to a
degree of legal obedience. 1
20
The previous discussion suggests that the broad right of private property
conferred on citizens of West Germany was not mirrored in East Germany due
to a rigid division between social and private ownership. The connection
between the political and legal systems of the two states is obvious.' This
review of East German property doctrine reveals that the private property right
of its citizens was limited to the possession and non-productive use of
resources and that no private exclusionary right applied to production.
V. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION
A. The German Economies at the Time of Reunification
Less than half a century of a divided Germany is adequate to suggest the
powerful impact that the presence or absence of the exclusionary right in the
production of what people need and want can have on the economy of a
modem nation. The separation of a common people following World War II
based primarily in an economic sense on whether or not the populations
enjoyed private property in the production and subsequent distribution of
resources provides the closest approximation to a controlled experiment of the
wealth effects of the exclusionary right. However, since little accurate
information is available on the East Germany economy during the period of
separation 122 it is not until incorporation of East Germany into the Federal
" East Germany had as many judges per capita as West Germany. WESEL, supra note 90,
at 135.
120 The number of lawyers in East Germany was extremely low. In 1989, West Germany had
eighty-seven lawyers per 100,000 inhabitants, while East Germany had 3.5 lawyers per 100,000
inhabitants. The number of prosecuting attorneys, however, was the same in West and East
Germany. Since reunification, the number of private attorneys has increased exponentially in
the former East Germany. Id.
121 Westen, supra note 60, at 15.
122 Leslie Lipschitz, Introduction and Overview, in GERMAN UNIFICATION-ECONOMIC
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Republic of Germany that measurements revealed the productive differences
in the two economies.
What is known is that at the time of reunification the West Germany
economy was one of the most powerful in the world with high per capita
income for its citizens.'23 There was strong demand for the goods and services
produced by private companies, which had high levels of capacity utilization,
abundant internal company resources, and large profits.'24 The federal
government of West Germany was operating with a budgetary surplus and the
national savings rate exceeded national investment by some 4.5% of GNP, 25
while the country had attracted net foreign investments of $300 billion.'26
If West Germany was prospering at the time of reunification, East Germany
was not. Although East German economic statistics were mostly unreliable,'27
by reunification more dependable economic analysis had become feasible.
Relative to West Germany, the best available data indicates that East Germany
had only about one-tenth the GNP of its neighbor, 2 ' two-fifths the per capita
income, 129 and one-third the average wage and labor productivity. 3 ' In
addition, at reunification the East German enterprise system was heavily
indebted with considerable obsolescence in both structure and products.'
ISSUEs 1, 3 (Leslie Lipschitz & Donogh McDonald eds., 1990) [hereinafter GERMAN
UNIFICATION] ("Although the statistics on demographics and on the characteristics of the labor
force and its distribution by sector were reliable, historical data on income, output, prices, and
the financial situation of enterprises provided little guidance to the economic situation."); see
also Thomas Mayer & Gunther Thumann, German Democratic Republic-Background and
Plans for Reform, in GERMAN UNIFICATION, supra, at 52 (stating that economic performance was
in fact much worse than the official figures); PuiLLup J. BRYSON & MANFRED MELZER, THE END
OF THE EAST GERMAN ECONOMY-FROM HONECKER TO REUNIFICATION xii (1991) (stating that
it was doubtful that even top East German leaders themselves knew how badly things were
going. Economic reports were regularly embellished, statistics managed, and the leadership told
what they wanted to hear.).
23 In 1990 the per capita incomes of West German citizens ranked seventh in the world.
Deutschland Online, Nov. 4, 2005, http://www.magazin-deutschland.de/issue/standort6-04-
ENG-EI.php.
124 Lipschitz, supra note 122, at 1-2.
25 Id. at 2-3.
126 id.
127 See supra note 122.
128 Lipschitz, supra note 122, at 3-4 (at that time the population ofEast Germany was roughly
one-fourth of that of West Germany).
129 Id. (calculated from the fact that East Germany had two-fifths of the population of West
Germany but one-tenth of its GNP).
130 Id.
131 Id.
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"Luxury goods" were largely unavailable to consumers and the general range
of products available was limited. 132 Economic infrastructure, including the
rail system, highways, and telecommunications facilities were requiring
extensive renewal, 133 and enormous environmental problems plagued East
Germany, especially in the chemical sector. 34 Finally, the East German
pension system upon which the working population relied was severely
underfunded. 35
B. The Economy in the Former East Germany Following Reunification
Immediately after reunification, real net output of the German economy
initially shrank. In 1990 the West German per capita GNP was DM 40,200,
while reunified Germany's per capita GNP in the following year was DM
34,990.136 A year after reunification, output in the territories of the former East
Germany had completely collapsed, and the industrial base had virtually
disintegrated,'37 resulting in high unemployment. 3 Because of the sudden
exposure to western competition, only one out of 116 former East German
state-owned combines was in position to cover long-term costs and compete
in a private market.' 39 Without subsidies many businesses would have faced
immediate closure. Out of the entire stock of government-owned enterprises,
only fourteen companies, representing 8.2% of the workforce, were able to
132 Id. at 4.
.33 See, e.g., M. Donald Hancock, Economic and Political Performance: Patterns and
Prospects, in GERMAN UNIFICATION: PROCESS AND OUTCOMES 245, 248 (M. Donald Hancock
& Helga A. Welsh eds., 1994).
134 Id.
133 The importance of this revealing fact is that approximately half of the West German
subsidy to the eastern population upon reunification went to bolster this economic shortfall.
36 Roland Czada, The German Political Economy in Flux, in TEN YEARS OF GERMAN
UNIFICATION: TRANSFER, TRANSFORMATION, INCORPORATION? 151, 157 (J6rn Leonhard &
Lothar Funk eds., 2002) [hereinafter TEN YEARS OF GERMAN UNIFCATION].
"' Carsten Hefeker & Norbert Wunner, Great Expectations, Hard Times: A Political
Economic History of German Unification, in TEN YEARS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION, supra note
136, at 168, 168.
13s See, e.g., Hancock, supra note 133, at 249 ("From the attainment of the monetary,
economic, and social union on 1 July 1990 through November 1992, the size of the workforce
in the former GDR shrank from 9.2 million workers to approximately 6 million. The number of
farmers was reduced by half (to 160,000).").
"' Hefeker & Wunner, supra note 137, at 172.
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cover short-run costs. 140 As a result, industrial production fell by 28% in 1990
and an additional 30% in 1991. 4
1
Emerging from the initial shock, however, the economy in the territories of
the former East Germany has experienced substantial real growth since
reunification. The real GNP in the territories of the former East Germany grew
from Euro 215.4 billion in 1991 to Euro 291.8 billion in 2002.142 Relative to
per capita GNP in the territories of the former West Germany, real GNP in the
territories of the former East Germany increased from 49% to 66% from 1991
to 2002."3 Growth in annual per capita GNP in the territories of the former
East Germany has outpaced development in the territories of the former West
Germany (see Figure 1),'" and wages have risen from less than 33% to
approximately 75% of wages in the territories of the former West Germany.4 5
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
West 0.7 -1.4 2.0 1.5 0.7 1.4 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.6 0.7
East 23.0 14.8 8.8 2.5 3.9 2.9 0.2 2.0 2.3 1.3 1.8 2.1
FIGURE 1 - ANNUAL INCREASE IN GERMAN PER CAPITA REAL GNP
C. Discussion
The incorporation of East Germany into the Federal Republic of Germany
should in no way be conceptualized as a mixing of the two institutional
frameworks of the respective states, but rather it should be grasped as a merger
of the territories of East Germany back into the Federal Republic. 46 The
guiding institutions of reunification have been those of the Federal Republic
of Germany, and the most basic institution has been an adequately established
and enforced legal exclusionary right as applied to the production and
distribution of resources. It must be emphasized that the economic success of
140 Id.
141 id.
142 BUNDESMINISTERIUM FJER WTSCHAFT UND ARBEIT [MINISTRY FOR ECONOMIC AND
LABOR], WIRTSCHAFTSDATEN NEUE LANDER [ ECONOMIC DATAFORTHE NEW STATES] 3 (2004)
[hereinafter WIRTSCHAFTSDATEN] (Figures are given in 1995 prices to correct for inflation).
143 Id.
'44 Id. at 4.
14' Henning Klodt, Public Transfers and Industrial Restructuring in Eastern Germany, in
TEN YEARS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION, supra note 136, at 211, 212.
146 Lipschitz, supra note 122, at 5.
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reunification for the territories of the former East Germany has in its essence
been primarily due neither to the Federal Republic of Germany's political
democracy nor its free market capitalism--although both these institutions are
important-but to a strong private property institution in production. Stable
political democracy may be a salient indicator of economic prosperity but only
as it provides for the adequate enforcement of the private exclusionary right
under the rule of law. Free market capitalism is the preferred system of every
prosperous nation, but as the Peruvian economist Hemando de Soto observes,
the reason "why capitalism succeeds in the West and fails everywhere else" '147
is due to the investment climate of certainty and the economic energy of
incentive fostered by private property in productive resources. 4 ' A free
market itself, without the sustaining legal framework of private property, could
hardly have engendered the substantial economic growth that has taken place
in the former East Germany. 1
49
Nor has that growth been dependent on subsidies from the prosperous
territories of the former West Germany. Although sizable financial transfers
were initially necessary to buffer the total collapse of the industrial sector in
the territories of the former East Germany,1 50 it is important to analyze the
nature of federal subsidies in the eastern economy to understand that the
former East Germany has developed genuine property-based growth. From
1991 to 2003, cumulative direct federal economic support to the territories of
the former East Germany amounted to 315.5 billion Euros. 5' Larger figures
have recently been reported, but those numbers include the large payments
required to bring the decimated pension funds of former East German citizens
up to West German standards and to institute an unemployment insurance
regime." To meet these needs of the former East Germany, social transfer
147 This is the subtitle of de Soto's most recent book. See supra note 28.
148 The need in economically developing nations for unleashing the developmental power of
a property-based legal system is the subject of DE SOTO, supra note 28. See also HERNANDO DE
SOTO, THE OTHER PATH (1989).
' Consider as evidence the economic debacle that occurred in Russia after the collapse of
the former Soviet Union. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. Russia had the trappings
of a free market but not an adequately established and enforced private property system.
iso Klodt, supra note 145, at 213.
'51 WIRTSCHAFTSDATEN, supra note 142, at 18.
152 Gabor Steingart,Aujbau OstdurchAbbau West: Helmut Kohl-Kanzler des Niedergangs
[Structure the East by Dismantling the West: Chancellor Helmut Kohl-A Policy of Decline,
SPIEGEL ONLINE, Apr. 5, 2004, available at http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0, 1518,
294097,00.html (last visited June 28, 2005) (stating government figures that the cost of
unification amounted to Euro 1.25 trillion); see also Klodt, supra note 145, at 211 (arguing that
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payments did rise dramatically after reunification.'5 3 The estimated transfer
payments from the western to the eastern territories amounts to about DM 140
billion annually;' 54 however, as the GNP in the former GNP recovered from the
shock caused by the transformation, the relative importance of the transfers,
measured as a percentage of GNP, declined. "' While the absolute size of the
transfers did not decrease, their size relative to GNP in the former East
Germany decreased,'56 indicating independent growth when considering also
a rising East Germany. Additionally, in light of the fact that the great majority
of the transfers went into creating social security benefits,' the significance
of subsidies to growth in the former East Germany further decreases. From
1991 to 1998, transfers to social security accounts in the former East Germany
nearly equaled 50% of the total transfer payments; federal business subsidies
accounted for less than 25% of the transfers. 158
The problems confronting Germany in the decade after unification are the
consequence of an unprecedented legal, economic, and political merger of two
highly disparate industrial societies,'59 but the problems are not insurmount-
able. It is true that the western population of the Federal Republic of Germany
complained of the taxation necessary to bring the eastern population to social
welfare standards and that the population of the former East Germany have
suffered economic dislocation, unemployment, and psychological stress upon
"public transfers do not only contribute to reconstructing the eastern German economy, but are
also associated with undesired side-effects that significantly disturb the catching-up process and,
thus, tend to stabilize the gap between eastern and western Germany" by inhibiting the evolution
of a viable, market-oriented economy in the former East Germany).
' Czada, supra note 136, at 159.
15' Hefeker & Wunner, supra note 137, at 169. Hefeker and Wunner decry that hardly any
signs of a self-sustaining economic recovery exist in the former East Germany, especially in light
of predictions that would have suggested a quick recovery for the former East Germany. It is the
opinion of the authors of this Article that Hefeker and Wunner are distracted by the political
promises made by politicians in the Federal Republic of Germany immediately after the
reunification. Chancellor Kohl's famous promise of "flourishing landscapes" still rings in
everybody's ears.
' Klodt, supra note 145, at 213.
16 Id. at 211 (indicating net transfers as percentage of GNP in the former East Germany of
51% in 1991, 43% in 1992,40% in 1993, 35% in 1994, and 33% in 1998).
157 See id. at 214.
"58 LUTZ BELLMAN & MARTIN BRUSSIG, AUSMANN UND URSACHEN DER
PRODUKTIVITATSLOCKE OSTDEUTSCHER BETRIEBE DES VERARBEITENDEN GERWERBES [EXTENT
AND CAUSES FOR THE PRODUCTIVITY GAP OF EAST GERMAN MANUFACTURING COMPANIEs] 53
(1998).
159 Hancock, supra note 133, at 245.
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losing their prior positions in a command economy. 6° It is likewise correct
that economic policies which led some investors to speculate in real estate in
the former East Germany instead of job-creating businesses may have sent
other investors to Poland and its neighbors. 61 One cannot expect that the
effects of more than forty years of central command economy are swept away
without tax burdens and some individual hardships. It may take the former
East Germany many more years to catch up with the rest of the Federal
Republic of Germany, but with growth already far outpacing federal subsidies,
the former East Germany is well on its road to property-based prosperity.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary the chief difference between West and East Germany lay in
how the two countries implemented their property systems. West Germany
enjoyed a well-established and well-enforced private exclusionary right
applied to the uses of productive resources, whereas East Germany took a
public (social) property approach to production and distribution. So central is
the concept of property to all societies that it is appropriate to attribute the
economic deficiencies of East Germany to how it applied property and the
economic improvement of the eastern Germans following incorporation in the
Federal Republic of Germany to the economic benefits brought by the general
application of private property to the productive process. Although specific
economic policies like interest rate adjustments or tax incentives may be
important to the fine tuning of a property-based private market, it is the stable
application of the legal exclusionary right in ordering the production of
resources that provides the certainty necessary for a successful market in the
modem nation.
The legal realists and critical studies legal scholars who have attempted to
deconstruct property and its application under the rule of law to mere power
relations have missed the point that the attempt--even theoretical-to tear
..0 Czada, supra note 136, at 156; see, e.g., Steingart, supra note 152.
161 See Marcus Walker& Matthew Karnitschnig, Eastern Europe Eclipses Eastern Germany,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2004, at Al 8. Note, however, that higher economic growth rates in some
eastern European countries when contrasted with growth in the former East Germany may be
accounted for by the fact that countries like Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic started
from a lower GNP economic base than East Germany, and thus equivalent real growth among
all the countries would translate into a much higher percentage GNP growth rate in those poorer
countries, a differential growth rate that Walker and Karnitschnig rely upon to make their point.
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down institutional structures which order society in relation to needed and
wanted resources and to stimulate new production without rebuilding
something in its place is an ultimately nihilistic enterprise. Although in the
final analysis, "property" is just a word that can be manipulated by legal
realists, critical studies scholars, and free market economists alike, its usage
throughout history permits an essential functional understanding of it as a right
of exclusion, a legal construct permitting one or some but not all persons to
keep others from interfering with resources, including the resources of human
action, as long as the resources of all are respected. The objects to which
property applies do not have a priori status but derive from history and a
general understanding that whatever resource or range of resources society
wants to increase maximally should be made objects of the exclusionary right.
To have an essential understanding of property is to appreciate why some
nations are prosperous while others are poor, but this understanding does not
itself suddenly create the wealth-generating capacity of a property-based legal
system. Many problems of initiating this institution and overcoming
prosperity-defeating path dependence remain. However, if the goal is to foster
maximum conditions for self-sustaining, productive economies for the world's
poor, the adequate implementation of property is sine qua non.

